Friday, 20 April 2018

Right to be Forgotten - NT1 and another v Google

Royal Courts of Justice
Author Rafa Esteve
Licence Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike 4.0 International
Source Wikipedia

















Jane Lambert

Queen's Bench Division (Mr Justice Warby) NT 1 and NT 2 v Google LLC [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) (13 Apr 2018)

These were claims by two businessmen known respectively as NT1 and NT2 against Google LLC.  Both claimants had been  convicted of criminal offences but, as their convictions had been spent, they sought orders requiring details of their offending, convictions and sentences to be removed from Google's search results on the grounds that the information was inaccurate, old, out of date, irrelevant, of no public interest, and/or otherwise an illegitimate interference with their human rights. The claimants also sought compensation from Google for continuing to return search results disclosing such details, after those complaints had been brought to its notice. The actiod to block one link on 7 Oct 2014 but declined to block any of the others. NT1 asked Google to reconsider his request, but Google stood by its position. On 26 Jan 2015, NT1's solicitors wrote to Google requiring it to cease processing links to 2 media reports. In April 2015, Google refused. NT1 brought these proceedings on 2 Oct 2015 seeking orders for the blocking and/or erasure of links to the 2 media reports, an injunction to prevent Google from continuing to return such links, and financial compensation. In December 2017, NT1 expanded his claim to cover a third link, relating to a book extract covering the same subject-matter, in similar terms.

NT2's Claim
His lordship summarized NT2's claim at para [7]:
"In the early 21st century, when he was in his forties, NT2 was involved in a controversial business that was the subject of public opposition over its environmental practices. Rather more than ten years ago he pleaded guilty to two counts of conspiracy in connection with that business, and received a short custodial sentence. The conviction and sentence were the subject of reports in the national and local media at the time. NT2 served some six weeks in custody before being released on licence. The sentence came to an end over ten years ago. The conviction became "spent" several years ago. The original reports remained online, and links continued to be returned by Google Search. NT2's conviction and sentence have also been mentioned in some more recent publications about other matters, two of them being reports of interviews given by NT2. In due course, NT2 asked Google to remove such links."
NT2's solicitors submitted a delisting request on 14 Apr 2015. It related to 8 links. Google responded promptly by email, on 23 Apr 2015 declining to delist, saying that the links in question "relate to matters of substantial public interest to the public regarding [NT2's] professional life". On 24 June 2015, NT2's solicitors sent a letter of claim. On 2 Oct 2015 they issued proceedings, claiming relief in respect of the same 8 links as NT2. In the course of the proceedings, complaints about a further 3 links were added to the claim. The claim advanced by NT2 therefore relates to 11 items.

The Issues
The judge summarized the issues in dispute in each case as follows at para [9]:
"(1) whether the claimant is entitled to have the links in question excluded from Google Search results either
(a) because one or more of them contain personal data relating to him which are inaccurate, or
(b) because for that and/or other reasons the continued listing of those links by Google involves an unjustified interference with the claimant's data protection and/or privacy rights; and 
(2) if so, whether the claimant is also entitled to compensation for continued listing between the time of the delisting request and judgment."
His lordship added:
"Put another way, the first question is whether the record needs correcting; the second question is whether the data protection or privacy rights of these claimants extend to having shameful episodes in their personal history eliminated from Google Search; thirdly, there is the question of whether damages should be paid."
The judge noted at para [10] that these were novel questions that had never been considered by the courts. They arose in a legal environment which was complex and had developed over time.

The Legal Framework
At para [13] of his judgment Mr Justice Warby set out the legal framework:
  1. The European Convention on Human Rights ("the Convention") and in particular art 8 and art 10;
  2. S.3 (1) of the European Communities Act 1972 requiring courts in the UK to make decisions on matters of EU law in accordance with decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union ("CJEU");
  3. The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 which provide for certain convictions to be spent after specified periods of time;
  4. The Data Protection Directive and in particulars arts 2, 6, 8, 9, 12, 14, 23 and 29;
  5. The Data Protection Act 1998 and its implementing regulations;
  6. The Human Rights Act 1998 which imported the Convention into English law;
  7. The decisions of the House of Lords in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] AC 457, [2004] EMLR 15, [2004] 2 AC 457, [2004] UKHRR 648, [2004] 2 All ER 995, [2004] HRLR 24, [2004] UKHL 22, 16 BHRC 500, [2004] 2 WLR 1232 and Re S (a child) [2004] UKHL 47, [2004] 3 WLR 1129, [2004] 4 All ER 683, [2004] 3 FCR 407, [2005] AC 593, [2005] HRLR 5, 17 BHRC 646, [2005] EMLR 2, [2005] Crim LR 310, [2005] 1 FLR 591, [2005] EMLR 11, [2005] 1 AC 593, [2005] UKHRR 129;
  8. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ 18.12.2000 C 364/1);
  9. The decision of the CJEU in C-131/12 Mario Costeja Gonzalez v Google Spain and another EU:C:2014:317, [2014] 3 WLR 659, [2014] EUECJ C-131/12, [2014] All ER (EC) 717, [2014] EMLR 27, [2014] 3 CMLR 50, [2014] ECDR 16, [2014] 2 All ER (Comm) 301, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, [2014] 1 QB 1022, 36 BHRC 589, [2014] QB 1022; and
  10. The General Data Protection Regulation ("CDPR") and in particular art 17.
NT1's Contentions
NT1 contended that Google was a "data controller" within the meaning of s.1 (1) of the Data Protection Act 1998 and that it owed him a duty under s.4 (4) to process data relating to him in accordance with the "data protection principles" as set out in Sched. 1 to the  Act.  He complained that Google had breached the 1st, 4th, 5th and 6th principles:
"1.  Personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully and, in particular, shall not be processed unless
(a)   at least one of the conditions in Schedule 2 is met, and
(b)   in the case of sensitive personal data, at least one of the conditions in Schedule 3 is also met.
.......................................
4.   Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date.
5.   Personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be kept for longer than is necessary for that purpose or those purposes.
6.   Personal data shall be processed in accordance with the rights of data subjects under this Act."
NT1 alleged that Google had breached the 4th data protection principle by linking to 6 articles that contained inaccuracies.  In the alternative he argued that linking to those articles breached one or more of the other principles.

Google's Response to NT1
Google admitted that it was a data controller, that it owed a duty to comply with the data protection principles, that there were inaccuracies in the 6 articles and that it had to balance the interests of the data subject against those of public in accordance with the CJEU's judgment in the Google Spain case but offered the following three-pronged defence.  First, it argued that NT1's claim was an abuse of the process of the court on the ground that NT1 was using the Data Protection Act 1998 to obtain relief for damage to reputation that would be unavailable in defamation proceedings by reason of s.8 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974.  Secondly, it contended that it had carried out properly the balancing exercise prescribed by the CJEU in Google Spain.  Thirdly, it relied on s.32 of the 1998 Act which provides a limited exemption for journalistic purposes.

The Judgment on NT1's Claim
Though he rejected Google's abuse of process argument and its journalistic purpose defence, Mr Justice Warby found for Google,

As to the abuse of process argument, his lordship agreed that NT1 had brought this action in order to protect his reputation but he was also relying on the CJEU's decision in Google Spain. He accepted NT1's submission that "the Court should not be too liberal in its labelling of prejudice as 'injury to reputation', lest it undermine the Google Spain regime."

He rejected the s.32 defence on the ground that Google's processing of personal data was not only for journalistic, literary or artistic purposes as required by s.32 (1).  Google was a search engine and as such it processed personal data for all sorts of purposes.  Secondly, s.32 (1) (b) and (c) required "reasonable belief" on Google's part that publication would be in the public interest and that complying with the data protection principles would be incompatible with the journalistic, literary or artistic purposes. The judge could find no evidence that Google had given any thought to the public interest.

At paragraph [93] of his judgment, the judge considered whether the 4th data protection principle had been breached.  He found a few inaccuracies in the articles to which NT1 objected but they were not so serious as to give a false impression of the crimes of which he had been convicted.  Some of NT1's complaints had been insufficiently pleaded.  Other complains were not supported by the evidence.  Even where there were inaccuracies the judge was not persuaded to make any of the orders sought or to award compensation.

As to the other alleged breaches his lordship held that the public interest outweighed the case for delisting. He explained his reasoning at para [170]:
"The information retains sufficient relevance today. He has not accepted his guilt, has misled the public and this Court, and shows no remorse over any of these matters. He remains in business, and the information serves the purpose of minimising the risk that he will continue to mislead, as he has in the past. Delisting would not erase the information from the record altogether, but it would make it much harder to find. The case for delisting is not made out."
For much the same reason he held that the public interest outweighed NT1's reasonable  expectation of privacy under art 8 of the Convention.

The Judgment on NT2's Claim
Although the issues in his case were much the same as in NT1's, NT2 impressed the judge as "an honest and generally reliable witness who listened carefully to the questions put to him, and gave clear and relevant answers." The one article, or item, of which the claimant complained was not a contemporary report of the conviction or sentencing. It had appeared in a national newspaper over 8 years after NT2 had been sentenced.  The judge found at para [190] that the article was inaccurate and gave a misleading complaint as to the claimant's criminality. Because of the inaccuracy the judge was prepared to make a delisting order.

After performing the Google Spain balancing exercise, the judge concluded at [223]:
"My key conclusions in respect of NT2's delisting claim are that the crime and punishment information has become out of date, irrelevant and of no sufficient legitimate interest to users of Google Search to justify its continued availability, so that an appropriate delisting order should be made. The conviction was always going to become spent, and it did so in March 2014, though it would have done so in July of that year anyway. NT2 has frankly acknowledged his guilt, and expressed genuine remorse. There is no evidence of any risk of repetition. His current business activities are in a field quite different from that in which he was operating at the time. His past offending is of little if any relevance to anybody's assessment of his suitability to engage in relevant business activity now, or in the future. There is no real need for anybody to be warned about that activity."
As to whether NT2 had a reasonable expectation of privacy under art 8 of the Convention, Mr Justice Wardle  said at [226]:
"The impact on the claimant is such as to engage Article 8. The business prejudice does not suffice for that purpose, but there is just enough in the realm of private and family life to cross the threshold. The existence of a young, second family is a matter of some weight. Even so, the evidence does not, in the end, demonstrate a grave interference. But it is enough to require a justification. Google's case on relevance is very weak. The claimant's evidence suggests that he has acknowledged his past error. The claimant's current and anticipated future business conduct does not make his past conduct relevant to anybody's assessment of him, or not significantly so. Continued accessibility of the information complained of is hard to justify. The factors that go to support that view are weak, by comparison with those that weigh in favour of delisting."
Though the judge decided to make a delisting order he was not persuaded to award compensation as he considered that Google had acted with reasonable care in dealing with NT2's request.

Comment
These are two cases with very similar issues and arguments but significantly different facts  NT2's wrongdoing was of a lesser order than NT1's. He had expressed contrition. The article of which NT2 complained had been inaccurate and misleading whereas those of which NT1 complained were not.  Unlike NT1, NT2 was trying to rebuild his life in a different business  where there was no danger of his repeating his wrongdoing. He was therefore reasonably entitled to privacy.  That is why the balance tipped in NT2's favour but not NT1's.

The judgment is useful in that it lists the authorities to which the court will have regard in future cases and the methodology to be applied in Google Spain cases.  Save that courts will cease to consider the Data Protection Directive and the Data Protection Act 1998 as part of the legal framework after 25 May 2018 the approach to issues of this kind will probably be the same under the GDPR.

Finally, Mr Justice Wardle's decision has been widely reported as a defeat for Google (eg Google loses "right to be forgotten" case 13 Apr 2018), that is not completely true. Google was completely successful in NT1's case and resisted the claim for compensation in NT2's.

Should amplification or clarification be required, call me on 020 7404 5252 during office hours or send me a message through my contact form.

Tuesday, 27 March 2018

Information Commissioner's Charges after GDPR

Bank of England
Author Adrian Pingstone
Licence Copyright waived by owner
Source Wikipedia























Jane Lambert

The General Data Protection Regulation ("GDPR") imposes a number of new obligations on data controllers but it does not require them to pay any money unlike the Data Protection Act 1984 and the Data Protection Act 1998.  A small but very welcome concession in exchange for responsibilities that will increase the costs of compliance one might have thought.

Fat chance! Our own Parliament has passed the Digital Economy Act 2017 section 108 (1) of which enables the Secretary of State to make regulations that "require data controllers to pay charges of an amount specified in the regulations to the Information Commissioner." The government has now published draft regulations under that provision known as The Data Protection (Charges and Information) Regulations 2018 which will come into effect on 25 May 2018. The Explanatory Note  states that they will replace The Data Protection (Notification and Notification Fees) Regulations 2000 SI 2000 No 188.

According to the Information Commissioner;s press release, this legislation has been enacted because the government has a statutory duty to ensure that the Information Commissioner's Office is adequately funded (see New model announced for funding the data protection work of the Information Commissioner’s Office 21 Feb 2018 ICO's News and Blogs). They have a point there.  I for one was heartened by photos of ICO investigators doing their job in relation to recent personal data misuse allegations (see Investigators complete seven-hour Cambridge Analytica HQ search 24 March 2018 The Guardian).

The amount of the new charges is set out in reg 3 (1):
"For the purposes of regulation 2 (2), the charge payable by a data controller in—
(a) tier 1 (micro organisations), is £40;
(b) tier 2 (small and medium organisations), is £60
(c) tier 3 (large organisations), is £2,900."
To qualify as a "micro organisation" a business must:
(i)  have a turnover of less than or equal to £632,000 for the data controller’s financial year,
(ii) no more that 10 members of staff;
(iii) be a charity, or
(iv) be a small occupational pension scheme.
As micro organizations will be offered a £5 discount if they pay by direct debit, the new rules will not increase their payments at all if they take advantage of the concession.   For businesses in tier 3 there will be a massive increase from £500 to £2,900 per year.   The new rates are intended to reflect the relative risk for each category of data controller.

Anyone wishing to discuss these rules or data protection in general should call me on 020 7404 5252 during office hours or send me a message through my contact form.

Friday, 23 March 2018

Consent to Processing of Personal Data

Author The Opte Project
Licence CC BY 2.5
Source Wikimedia Commons


























Jane Lambert

One of the questions I am asked most frequently whenever I give a talk on the General Data Protection Regulation  ("GDPR") is whether it is necessary to seek renewed consent from existing subscribers to newsletters and other services. That ties up  with something else that has happened over the last few days.  I have received several requests to renew subscriptions to newsletters and other online services that I have used for years.

The reason for that most frequently asked question is that art 5 (2) of the  Regulation requires data controllers not only to comply with data protection principles that have existed in one form or another in every previous data protection statute as well as the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data and the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data but also to demonstrate compliance with those principles. The first of those principles is that personal data shall be processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject.  Art 6 (1) of the GDPR provides 6 grounds for the lawful processing of personal data one of which is that "(a)  the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes" (art 6 (1) (a) GDPR). Data controllers have focused on that ground because it is easiest to prove. 

However, such consent must be freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous.  Art 7 (1) provides:
"Where processing is based on consent, the controller shall be able to demonstrate that the data subject has consented to processing of his or her personal data."
Art 7 (4) adds:
"When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract. 
Paragraph 32 of the recitals explains the policy for this requirement:
"Consent should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject's agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her, such as by a written statement, including by electronic means, or an oral statement. This could include ticking a box when visiting an internet website, choosing technical settings for information society services or another statement or conduct which clearly indicates in this context the data subject's acceptance of the proposed processing of his or her personal data. Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent. Consent should cover all processing activities carried out for the same purpose or purposes. When the processing has multiple purposes, consent should be given for all of them. If the data subject's consent is to be given following a request by electronic means, the request must be clear, concise and not unnecessarily disruptive to the use of the service for which it is provided."
To ensure that the consent is informed, paragraph 42 adds:
"Where processing is based on the data subject's consent, the controller should be able to demonstrate that the data subject has given consent to the processing operation. In particular in the context of a written declaration on another matter, safeguards should ensure that the data subject is aware of the fact that and the extent to which consent is given. In accordance with Council Directive 93/13/EEC a declaration of consent pre-formulated by the controller should be provided in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language and it should not contain unfair terms. For consent to be informed, the data subject should be aware at least of the identity of the controller and the purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended. Consent should not be regarded as freely given if the data subject has no genuine or free choice or is unable to refuse or withdraw consent without detriment."
Paragraph 43 adds:
"In order to ensure that consent is freely given, consent should not provide a valid legal ground for the processing of personal data in a specific case where there is a clear imbalance between the data subject and the controller, in particular where the controller is a public authority and it is therefore unlikely that consent was freely given in all the circumstances of that specific situation. Consent is presumed not to be freely given if it does not allow separate consent to be given to different personal data processing operations despite it being appropriate in the individual case, or if the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the consent despite such consent not being necessary for such performance."
Pausing there, it is clear from paragraph 42 of the recitals that consent does not have to be in writing but it does have to be recorded if it is to be proved.  Art 7 (2) indicates that consent can be sought on a form that contains other matter.  However, if it is, the part  relating to consent must be clear and cover all the purposes for which the data is to be processed.  If the data are to be processed for more than one purpose, then the data subject's consent must be obtained separately for each of those processes.  Art 7 (3) of the GDPR entitles a data subject to withdraw his or her consent at any time.  Data subjects should be advised of their right to withdraw their consent at any time before they give it. It should not be more difficult to withdraw consent than it is to give consent.  Where the data controller and data subject have unequal bargaining power, the data controller should avoid using (or even giving the impression of using) its leverage to extract a data subject;'s consent.

Nothing in the GDPR suggests that consent has to be obtained or renewed specifically to comply with the Regulation but any consent that has been obtained in the past must have met the Regulation's conditions.  Indeed, paragraph 171 of the recitals states that where processing is based on consent pursuant to the existing law, it is not necessary for the data subject to give his or her consent again if the manner in which the consent has been given is in line with the conditions of the GDPR, so as to allow the controller to continue such processing after the date of application of this Regulation.

The last sentence of art 7 (2) provides:
"Any part of such a declaration which constitutes an infringement of this Regulation shall not be binding."
In other words, a data controller cannot rely on a data user's consent unless the above as a defence to any administrative action, civil claim or criminal prosecution unless the above conditions have been complied with,  On the other hand, if a data subject who has validly given his or her consent subsequently withdraws it, art 7 (3) makes clear that the withdrawal of consent shall not affect the lawfulness of processing based on consent before its withdrawal.

If a data subject is under the age of 16 (or such other age between 13 and 16 that a member state may set) art 8 (1) requires consent to be obtained from the person having parental responsibility for that data subject.  Art 8 (2) requires the data controller to make reasonable efforts to verify in such cases that consent is given or authorised by the holder of parental responsibility over the child, taking into consideration available technology.

Anyone wishing to discuss this article or data protection in general should call me on +44 (0)20 7404 5252 during office hours or message me through my contact form.

Wednesday, 7 February 2018

Judicial Remedies under the GDPR and other Data Protection Legislation

Jane Lambert











A lot of attention has focused on the massive increase in the Information Commissioner's and other supervisory authorities' power to fine under art 83 (4) and (5) of the GDPR but she acquires no new powers to compensate.  If a data subject requires compensation from a data controller or processor under art 82 (1) or some other judicial remedy pursuant to art 79, he or she will have to sue.

The Data Protection Bill, which has now completed its passage through the Lords and is now awaiting its second reading in the House of Commons, makes provision for that judicial remedy.  The courts of the United Kingdom are to have the power to make compliance orders under clause 165 and award compensation under clause 166 and clause 167.

Clause 165 (2) defines a compliance order as
"an order for the purposes of securing compliance with the data protection legislation which requires the controller in respect of the processing, or a processor acting on behalf of that controller—
(a) to take steps specified in the order, or
(b) to refrain from taking steps specified in the order."
This would seem to include an order by the court to a data controller to comply with a subject access request under clause 94 (11), an order not to process personal data under clause 99 (5) and rectification and erasure under clause 100 (4). Though there is no specific provision in the Bill for the court to restrain the transfer of personal data abroad under clause 109 (1) or to order a controller to take steps to implement the data protection principles or minimize the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects under clause 103 (2) there seems to be no reason why it should not do so.

As I mentioned in Claims by Data Subjects against Data Controllers and Processors under the GDPR 5 Jan 2018, the provisions relating to subject access, rectification and erasure stipulate that the High Court of England and Wales has exclusive jurisdiction to make such orders. However, there seems to be a contradiction in that clause 177 (1) and (2) seems to suggest that compliance orders as well as compensation may be awarded by the County Court as well as the High Court.

Clause 166 (1) provides for compensation for material or non-material damage including distress under art 82 GDPR for contravention of that regulation and clause 167 (1)  for compensation for material or non-material damage including distress under any other data protection legislation.

In future articles I shall discuss pleading claims  for judicial remedies for alleged breaches of the GDPR and other legislation and possible defences.  Anyone wishing to discuss this article should call me on 020 7404 5252 during office hours or send me a message through my contact form.

Sunday, 14 January 2018

Information Commissioner fines The Carphone Warehouse £400,000 for breaching the Seventh Data Protection Principle










Jane Lambert

In GDPR - Fines 7 Dec 2017 I outlined the Information Commissioner's existing powers under s.55A of the Data Protection Act 1998 and The Data Protection (Monetary Penalties) (Maximum Penalty and Notices) Regulations 2010 to impose monetary penalties on data controllers who contravene s.4 (4) of the Act. As I noted in that article, the maximum penalty that the Commissioner can impose is limited to £500,000 by reg 2 of those Regulations.

By a monetary penalty notice dated 8 Jan 2018 the Information Commissioner fined the Carphone Warehouse £400,000 (80% of the maximum under reg 2) for failing to prevent unauthorized access to the personal data of over 3 million of its customers and some 1,000 of its employees. 

Paragraph 7 of Sched. 1 of the Act provides:
"Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data."
Paragraphs 9 to 12 of the schedule add:
"The seventh principle
9. Having regard to the state of technological development and the cost of implementing any measures, the measures must ensure a level of security appropriate to—
(a)   the harm that might result from such unauthorised or unlawful processing or accidental loss, destruction or damage as are mentioned in the seventh principle, and
(b)   the nature of the data to be protected.
10. The data controller must take reasonable steps to ensure the reliability of any employees of his who have access to the personal data.
11. Where processing of personal data is carried out by a data processor on behalf of a data controller, the data controller must in order to comply with the seventh principle—
(a)   choose a data processor providing sufficient guarantees in respect of the technical and organisational security measures governing the processing to be carried out, and
(b)   take reasonable steps to ensure compliance with those measures.
12. Where processing of personal data is carried out by a data processor on behalf of a data controller, the data controller is not to be regarded as complying with the seventh principle unless—
(a) the processing is carried out under a contract—
(i)      which is made or evidenced in writing, and
(ii)     under which the data processor is to act only on instructions from the data controller, and
(b) the contract requires the data processor to comply with obligations equivalent to those imposed on a data controller by the seventh principle."
Based on evidence that had been submitted by the Carphone Warehouse which included reports by forensic specialists, the Commissioner found at paragraph 22 that the data controller had contravened the above data protection principle in 11 respects ranging from the use of out of date software to inadequate vulnerability scanning.  Having regard to the state of technological development, the cost of implementing any measures, the nature of the relevant personal data and the harm that might ensue from its misuse, the Commissioner's held was that there were multiple inadequacies in Carphone Warehouse's technical and organisational measures for ensuring the security of personal data on the System.

The Commissioner concluded that the requirements of s.55A (1) had been met. After considering both aggravating and mitigating factors she fixed the penalty at £400,000 to be paid by the 8 Feb 2018.  She offered the data controller a 20% discount if it pays the fine in full by 7 Feb 2018 and does not appeal. If it exercises its right of appeal it will forego the £80,000 discount. That leaves a very difficult decision for The Carphone Warehouse and its lawyers. If the company accepts the Commissioner's finding it risks claims for compensation in the civil courts by any one or more of its 3 million customers and 1,000 employees. On the other hand it will not be easy to appeal and the costs could well exceed £320,000.

Should anyone wish to discuss this note or data protection generally, he or she should call me on 020 7404 5252 during normal business hours or send me a message through my contact form.

Friday, 12 January 2018

Two Talks on GDPR on 24 Jan 2018 that are particularly worth attending















Jane Lambert

The BCS Law Specialist Group is one of a number of specialist groups within the British Computer Society. There are over 50 of them covering everything from advanced programming to software testing. You can find a list on the Specialist Groups page of the British Computer Society website. You can attend some meetings of some of those groups evers two talks on that subject which in my view are well worth attending if you live in or near, or happen to be in, London on 24 Jan 2018. On that day  Dr Sally Leivesley PhD Lond., MSPD, BA(Hons) Qld., FICPEM, FRSA, MACE, MIABTI, MRSES will talk about GDPR and Cryptography - Catastrophic Risk Principles between 18:30 and 19:15 and Ms Chiara Rustici will lead the BCS Specialist Group's second GDPR workshop between 19:30 and 20:45. Further details of both talks are available on the event web page.

Admission to both talks costs £10 for BCS members and £15 for everybody else which is very reasonable considering the eye-watering fees charged by some seminar organizers and commercial consultancies for a good deal less. The talks take place on the 1st floor of the Davidson Building at 5 Southampton Street, London, WC2E 7HA.

Friday, 5 January 2018

Claims by Data Subjects against Data Controllers and Processors under the GDPR

Royal Courts of Justice
Author Rafa Esteve
Licence Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike 4.0 International
Source Wikipedia


















Jane Lambert

In my article How the GDPR works 3 Dec 2017 I wrote that the General Data Protection Regulation ("GDPR") establishes a set of principles for processing personal data (data by which living human beings can be identified) and machinery for monitoring and enforcing compliance.  I added that "that machinery takes the form of rights for data subjects (the individuals who can be identified from the data) and obligations upon data controllers (those who control the processing of personal data) and processors (those who carry out the processing) to take reasonable steps to minimize the risk or effect of non-compliance."

Previous legislation required EU member states to establish supervisory authorities to regulate the processing of personal data in their respective territories and the supervisory authority for the United Kingdom is the Information Commissioner in Wilmslow near Manchester.  If a data subject believes that his or her rights under the GDPR have been infringed, he or she will be able to complain to the Information Commissioner or the supervisory authority of some other member state or sue the data controller or processor in the courts of the United Kingdom or some other member state.

This article considers the circumstances in which a data subject might wish to bring an action against a data controller or processor in the courts of England and Wales and how he or she might do so.

What is the GDPR?

In my Introduction to the GDPR 2 Dec 2017 I wrote that "the initials GDPR stand for the words “General Data Protection Regulation” which is "the short title for a law officially known as Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC." I added:
"The GDPR is thus a law to protect the interests of living individuals throughout the EU with regard to the processing of data by which they may be identified while safeguarding the free flow of information throughout the EU. It will come into being with equal effect in every member state without further intervention of the governments of those states."
It will come into force on 25 May 2018 and remain for as long as the United Kingdom remains in the European Union. However, many of its provisions will be preserved in a new Data Protection Bill which is now proceeding through Parliament (see my article Introduction to the Data Protection Bill  16 Sept 2017).

Right of Action

Art 79 (1) of the GDPR provides:
"Without prejudice to any available administrative or non-judicial remedy, including the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority pursuant to Article 77, each data subject shall have the right to an effective judicial remedy where he or she considers that his or her rights under this Regulation have been infringed as a result of the processing of his or her personal data in non-compliance with this Regulation."
Such a right of action is not new.  EU member states are already required to provide a judicial remedy for any breach of the rights guaranteed by the national law applicable to the processing in question under art 22 of the Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data). In the United Kingdom, the judicial remedy mentioned in art 22 is implemented by s.15 (1) of the Data Protection Act 1998.

In what Circumstances could a Data Subject sue?

A data subject might wish to go to law to seek compensation under art 82 (1) of the GDPR for any material or non-material damage that he or she may have suffered as a result of an infringement of the regulation or for an order for the rectification or erasure of data, the restriction of data processing or any other relief that can only be granted by a court.

In which Court?

Art 79 (2) of the CDPR allow proceedings for compensation or other remedy to be brought in any member state in which the controller or processor.  Alternatively, they may be brought before the courts of the member state where the data subject has his or her habitual residence unless the controller or processor is a public authority of a member state acting in the exercise of its public powers. In that case the authority must be sued in the member state where it is located.  Clause 92 (13) of the Data Protection Bill provides that the jurisdiction to compel subject access requests may be exercised by the High Court in England and Wales, the High of Northern Ireland or the Court of Session in Scotland. Similarly, those courts have jurisdiction to hear objections to process under clause 97 (7) and to make orders for the rectification or erasure of personal data under clause 98 (6).  There is no equivalent provision for compliance orders under clause 158 or compensation under clause 159. By contrast, s.15 (1) of the Data Protection Act 1998 provides that claims under the Act may be brought before the High Court or the County Court in England and Wales or the Court of Session or a sheriff's court in Scotland.

How to bring Proceedings under the GDPR

It would appear that a claimant must prove:
  • the existence of a right under the GDPR;
  • an actual or threatened infringement of that right; and
  • damage resulting from the infringement.
The right may be express such as those that arise under Chapter III of the regulation or implied such as the right to object to the transfer of personal data abroad without the safeguards provided by Chapter V. The damage may be material or non-material and it must have resulted or be likely to result from an infringement of the data subject's right. A controller or processor has a complete defence under art 82 (3) of the GDPR if he or she can prove that he or she is not in any way responsible for the event giving rise to the damage.

Liability of Processors

One of the changes brought about by the GDPR is that processors can be sued for damage caused by non-compliance with the regulation or acts outside or contrary to the lawful instructions of the controller. This change is probably more apparent than real because processors that have failed to comply with relevant data protection legislation can usually be joined as Part 20 defendants either for breach of express or implied terms of their service level agreements or a common law duty of care.

Procedure

In the absence of a pre-action protocol for data protection complaints, data subjects, controllers and processors will be expected to comply with paragraph 6 of the Practice Direction - Pre-action Conduct and Protocols. Wherever possible, disputes should be settled through direct negotiations, arbitration, mediation or some other form of alternative dispute resolution. Those that cannot be resolved through negotiation or ADR may be brought in either the Queen's Bench Division or the Chancery Division. Claims for compensation are more likely to be brought in the Queen's Bench Division whereas those for compliance orders are more likely in the Chancery Division

Alternative Dispute Resolution

Parties seeking the appointment of a neutral to resolve a dispute under the GDPR or other data protection legislation may wish to consider one of the arbitrators or mediators of 4-5 Gray's Inn Square as James Bridgeman SC, the Hon Louis Harms, Caroline Kenny QC, Anthony Connerty, several other members of chambers and I have relevant knowledge and experience.

Further Information

Anyone wishing to discuss this article, the GDPR or data protection in general is invited to call me on +44 (0)20 7404 5252 during office hours or send me a message through my contact form.